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In recent years, differences between traditional and green parties have been leveled with 
respect to climate protection. We show that this partial convergence in party platforms can be 
explained by international climate agreements, effectively reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. We set up a voting model in which political parties differ in their preferences for 
climate protection and in which (national) climate protection causes both resource costs and 
distortions in the international allocation of production. International agreements, which 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, decrease effective abatement costs. This affects traditional 
parties in a different way than green parties, since a lower preference for climate protection 
implies a higher price (cost) elasticity of demand. Thus, climate agreements can lead to more 
political consensus within countries, even if politicians are partisans. We also point out that 
increasing flexibility and efficiency in abatement mechanisms is preferable  to forming a 
climate coalition that focuses directly on emission reduction commitments. 
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There is a puzzle in the dynamics of European politics, in particular in environmental and cli-
mate policy: On the one hand, a partial convergence in European politics and party platforms
can be observed in the last two decades, being especially the case for climate policy. Green
parties had ﬁrst been located to the (very) left in the political system after having emerged in
the late 1970s. Their unique selling property has been environmental policy by putting envi-
ronmental issues on the political agenda and by calling for a signiﬁcantly larger level of envi-
ronmental (climate) protection than all other parties. Nowadays, all other parties put climate
policy on their agenda, and green parties are perceived to be moving towards the center ground.
A salient example for such a convergence is Germany, revealing a striking continuity in anti-
climate change action, though there have been several ‘ideological’ changes in government. In
fact, all governments have not only continued the inherited policy, but also fostered efforts in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Blum and Schubert, 2009). The leveling in German
climate policy became most prominent when conservative Angela Merkel was celebrated as
‘climate chancellor’ at the G-8 meeting in Heiligendamm in 2007.1
On the other hand, according to recent empirical studies, there should be no convergence in
party platforms or in policies at all (as long as preferences are stable over time). These ﬁndings
strongly support the ‘partisan theory’ of ideological politicians, which contradicts any form
of the ‘Downsian paradigm’ and implies that considerations of being elected do not matter.
Relying on data for the U.S. House, Lee et al. (2004) for example convincingly show that
representatives’ roll-call voting behavior mirrors their own (ideological) preferences, but not
the likelihood of being (re-) elected. Thus, voters only elect a policy, but neither affect party
platforms nor behavior of politicians.
The observationsaboveseem to excludeeach other. Is it stillpossibleto explainthe dynamic
convergence in climate policy among ideological parties (i.e., among ‘partisan’ politicians)?
Continuatively, must green parties fear such a potential loss of their unique selling property?
Applying ideological parties, this paper points out that the observed convergence in climate
policies over time may be explained by international agreements, both reducing greenhouse
gas emissions and decreasing effective abatement costs. ‘Green’ parties lose their unique green
policy position, the more these agreements allow for ﬂexibility and cost reduction, since ‘non-
green’ parties will react more elastically in their ideological party platforms. Thereby, the
driving force – namely, reductions in policy implementation costs affecting party platforms
asymmetrically – could also be applied to other policy ﬁelds. This is a novel contribution to the
literature. So far, papers on (dynamic) policy convergence have focused on ﬁscal and welfare
policy in a left-wing/right-wing setting (see, e.g., Tavares, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Mechtel and
Potrafke, 2009; Potrafke, 2010, 2011a; Jensen, 2011). We are – to the best of our knowledge –
1Another example is Great Britain, where Prime Minister David Cameron turned the Conservative Party more
‘greenish’ in the election campaign of 2010.
2the ﬁrst, who examine partial convergence both by endogenizing policy implementation costs
and by focusing on environmental policy (and green parties), being a well-suited example.2 We
add a new explanatory channel to the literature on (dynamic) policy convergence of ideological
parties over time, focused so far on repeated games and two-level bargaining.
Alesina (1988) analyzes a voting model with two ideological parties, which not only value
being elected, but also have preferences on the implemented policies. He points out that neither
in one-shot games nor in ﬁnitely repeated games any policy convergence will emerge as long
as parties cannot be committed to their announcements in the electoral campaign. After being
elected, they will always implement their optimal policy.3 However, in an inﬁnitely repeated
election game, parties can coordinate and improve their utility by policy smoothing. To this
end, they have to choose identical platforms and policies (and to share ofﬁces). Reputational
losses (i.e., a loss in credibility) and a return to a one-shot solution (i.e., a trigger strategy), in
case of a one-time deviation once from the announced policies, can sustain full convergence
in a time-consistent way, if the discount factors for both parties are sufﬁciently high (i.e., if
they are sufﬁciently far-sighted). By an analogous argument, repeated interaction between two
parties can reduce macroeconomicﬂuctuations in a politicalbusiness cycle, see Alesina(1987).
Dorussen and Nanou (2006) pick up the approach of two-level games with national veto-
players(e.g., Putnam,1988)andrefertothethesisthatpolicyconvergenceonthedomesticlevel
restricts the government in the international bargaining, improving its bargaining power. The
authors extend this idea by arguing that domestic parties strategically converge to a joint policy
in order to improve the outcome on the supra-national level. Using the process of European
integration as an example, they provide some empirical evidence for their conclusions.
Alesina (1987, 1988) provides a rather static explanation, which cannot really explain the
change in platforms (on climate policy) over the last 20 years. Dorussen and Nanou (2006)
provide a convincing argument for EU integration, but their results imply that extreme parties
even divert and become more radical. This is not what we observe in environmental issues,
at least not in European countries. More important, none of the two explanations matches
the empirical results in Lee et al. (2004) of purely ideological, partisan politicians. Based on
Besley and Case (2003), Lee et al. explain their ﬁndings with the lack of credible commitment
devices for keeping the election campaign promise by a partisan politician to deviate from its
ex-post most preferred policy. Using Swedish data, Dahlberg et al. (2011) back this claim.
2There are related papers on environmental policy and political economy. Cremer et al. (2008) analyze po-
litical competition in environmental policy, when the concept of ‘Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium’ is applied,
explainingwhytwo ideologicalparties still can offerthe same low standardin environmentalprotectionandpoint-
ing out whyit is importantto generatesupportfor environmentalpolicies throughpolitical compromise. Buchholz
et al. (2005) examine international environmental agreements, but focus on strategic voting and the negotiation
process, applying a very different approach than we do. Neither paper has endogenized the effective costs of
climate protection.
3If there is full commitment and if the value of being elected is sufﬁciently large, the parties will meet at the
median voter preference as in the standard model by Downs (1957). See, e.g., Wittman (1977, 1983), Calvert
(1985), Persson and Tabellini (2000). However, this is neither convergence in a stricter dynamic sense nor does
the result hold if the number of parties increases (e.g., Palfrey, 1984)
3Analyzing the example of international climate protection, our ﬁndings imply that policies
can partially converge because of a decrease in effective abatement costs, even if parties be-
have like partisans. If climate protection becomes less costly in terms of private consumption
and ﬁrms’ proﬁts, traditional parties (e.g., conservative and social-democratic parties)4 react
more elastically than green parties on these cost reductions and the difference in their most
preferred platforms shrinks. Indeed, international agreements such as the Kyoto-Protocol have
signiﬁcantly decreased abatement costs in the last 15 years, by establishing emission trading
systems (ETS), installing a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and allowing for emission
allowances from activities of ‘avoided deforestation’ (REDD).5 Therefore, we provide an addi-
tional and relevant channel, which can explain the (partial) convergence of environmental party
platforms across all types of parties over time, showing the importance of climate change for
the political system.
In a one-dimensional voting setting, green parties do not need to fear this development, but
this may change if the model is extended to a multi-dimensional approach. Indeed, strate-
gic concerns in policy behavior might explain the failure of the post-Kyoto conference in
The Hague in 2000 and the position of the German green party in the debate on the nuclear
phaseout. Furthermore, applying our results to an international setting, it follows that invest-
ments into and coordination of efﬁcient and ﬂexible abatement mechanisms are preferable as
ﬁrst steps to spending resources on negotiations on more stringent emission reduction commit-
ments.
To derive our results, we set-up a model with n+1 countries, in which producing a pri-
vate good causes greenhouse gas (CO2) emissions. National governments regulate emissions
and, by fulﬁlling these regulations, costs for price-taking ﬁrms are caused, harming their in-
ternational competitiveness as well as reducing their proﬁts. Households consume the private
good and suffer from global emissions (‘global warming’), but differ in their preference for
climate protection. Ideological parties offer a party platform in each country, deﬁning a level
of national climate protection. This model allows to analyze what happens, if some countries
form a climatecoalition, which eitheragrees on implementingefﬁcient abatement mechanisms,
decreasing resource costs of carbon abatement, or on a common level of emission reduction.
Thereby, we focus on effects on party platforms and neglect government action, which can be
driven by compromises in governing coalitions.
In order to focus on the political economy aspects, party platforms on a national level and
the effect of endogenously decreasing abatement costs, we deliberately decided to suppress
other important topics. These are the interplay between income redistribution and optimal
climatepoliciesinanormativesetting(JacobsandvanderPloeg, 2010); thefree-ridingproblem
in forming climate agreements (though we implicitly allow for free-riding in national party
4By our deﬁnition, traditional parties are primarily interested in private consumption, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and eco-
nomic growth and value climate protection less than green parties.
5See, e.g., Brandt and Svendsen (2002); Br´ echet and Lussis (2006); Anger and Sathaye (2008).
4platforms), see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) and Barrett (2005); green paradoxes (e.g.,
Sinn, 2008; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2010). Indeed, redistributional concerns might even
foster oureffect of decreasing abatement costs. Neglectinggreen paradoxes can be defended by
the fact that for climate protection in general, it is more important to offset the effect of green
house gases than to avoid them. Offsetting could also be done by improved reafforestation (and
avoided deforestation of rain forests) or by separating and storing green house gases (e.g., by
carbon-dioxide-capture-and-storage technologies in coal-ﬁred power plants).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Then,
section 3 discusses the effect of international agreements on the party platforms of national
parties. An application of the approach to international negotiations on climate protection is
provided in section 4. The paper ends with conclusions in section 5.
2 The Model
We assume a world, which consists of n+1 countries, each inhabited by a continuum of house-
holds. All households consume an aggregate private good x. Production of this good causes
an additive atmosphere externality (Meade, 1952), which we will interpret as CO2-emissions,
causing global warming. Therefore, households suffer from global emissions E, and govern-
mentshaveanincentivetoimplementnationalemissionreductionsGi. However,thisregulation
will affect ﬁrms’ production costs and might suffer from carbon leakage.
Firms All ﬁrms are price takers and the world market price for the consumption good x is
denoted by p. There is one representative ﬁrm per country i, supplying xi(p) units to the world
market and having pure production costs c(xi).
The government in country i regulates national emissions of CO2 by enforcing a national
carbon abatement of Gi units. Firms must incur resource costs pG per unit of Gi and fulﬁlling
theclimate protectionregulation becomes moredifﬁcult (costly)the higherthe productionlevel
is. We capture this by assuming carbon abatement costs to be proportional to production.
Hence, the ﬁrm in country i faces total abatement costs cE
i = pG  Gi  xi. From the point of
view of a ﬁrm, the unit costs pG = pG(z) are exogenous; however, their level depends on the
abatement measures z, being implemented by the governments in international agreements.6
Proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by




− pG Gi xi. (1)
To simplify the analysis without affecting the main results, we assume convex pure produc-
tion costs c(xi) = c
2x2
i , and to save notation without loss of generality, we normalize the cost
parameter to one, that is c = 1.
6In order to save notation, we will drop the argument z, whenever this does not cause confusion.
5Maximizing proﬁts implies price equal to marginal costs so that optimal production xs
i in
country i is given by
xs
i = p− pG Gi, (2)










This approach neglects any positive effect of climate protection on production, i.e., innova-
tions and growth in ‘green’ industries. However, it is straightforward to show that incorporating
such spillover effects will even strengthen the results in this paper.
Households Population size in each country i is normalized to one and national households
only differ in their preference for climate protection. We assume the utility function of a house-
hold h in country i to be
ui = xd
i −aih vi(E), (4)
where xd
i represents utility from consumption and where aih  vi(E) is the disutility derived
from global warming and climate change. In this model, global warming is measured by global
emissions E. Assuming an increasing marginal disutility from global warming, we have v′
i >0,
v′′
i > 0. aih is the perception factor for climate change of household h in country i. The larger
is aih the more household h in country i proﬁts from a CO2-reduction.
As climate protection by reducing CO2-emissions is a global public good (or a positive at-
mosphere externality in the sense of Meade, 1952), the total level of emission E, consumed
by households in any country, decreases in all national carbon abatement Gi ∀ i. Accordingly,
global emissions are given by a function E = E(G1,...,Gn+1), which decreases in any national
emission reduction Gi, but at a non-increasing rate. Hence, we have ¶E





measures the effectiveness of (national) CO2 abatement and not assuming a one-to-one rela-
tionship between (claimed) abatement Gi and reduction in global emissions implicitly allows
for some ‘ineffectiveness’ (e.g., due to carbon leakage or a ‘green paradox’). Additionally, we
assume that a common level of national CO2 abatement leads to the same reduction in global
emissions, viz., ¶E
¶Gi = ¶E
¶Gj if Gi = Gj. This is sensible in our model since an equal abatement
level Gi = Gj implies the same level of production of the private good (i.e., xs
i = xs
j from equa-
tion (2)) as well as an equal total abatement input pG Gi xs
i = pG Gj xs
j. Finally, we impose
that global emission abatement by a given national emission reduction Gi is independent of the
effort in other countries; that is ¶2E
¶Gi¶Gj = 0.
Furthermore, we will assume that K = 1+k countries can form a climate coalition, which
agrees on collectiveaction and which implements the same level of national CO2 reductions Gc
in all member countries. The remaining n−k countries choose their carbon abatement effort
6independently. Accordingly, worldwide emissions are given by
E = E((1+k) Gc,Gk+2,...,Gn+1). (5)
The fully non-cooperative case results for k = 0 and Gc = G1.7
A household in country i is equipped with exogenous income Mi and earns a share in ﬁrm’s
proﬁt p∗
i . Since population size is normalized to one and the price of the private good is given







Market Equilibrium The world market equilibrium for the consumption good is determined













Multiplying by p, substituting equation (3) for national proﬁts p∗
i and equation (2) for national
supply xs

















(p− pGGj) = 0. (8)
Equation (8) implicitly determines the world market price p = p(pG,Gc,Gk+1,...,Gn,k) as
a function of marginal abatement costs pG, of the levels of national carbon abatement Gc and
Gj and of the number of members in the climate coalition K = 1+k. Totally differentiating
(8) exhibits the marginal effects of abatement costs pG, of the abatement effort Gc and of the

















The ﬁrst term on the RHS in equation (9) reveals a positive relation between the world









pG > 0. (10)
7The case of a fully atmospheric externality ` a la Meade (1952) would result, if we would assume ¶E
¶Gi = ¶E
¶Gj ,
∀ i, j, e.g., by deﬁning E = E(G) in which G = (1+k)Gc+å
n
j=k+1Gj.
7Higher marginal abatement costs, i.e., higher investment costs for reducing emissions on ﬁrm
level, increase production costs in all countries. By partially shifting the cost increase to the
demand side, the price of the consumption good will increase in the quadrat of the level of
national emission reduction.





pG > 0. (11)
Higher emission reduction Gc within the climate coalition (in country i), increases effective
production costs in the ﬁrms of these countries. Ceteris paribus the affected ﬁrms will decrease
their production, which will raise the world market price. The price increase is the higher
the more ﬁrms are affected, i.e., the larger is the climate coalition, and the higher the carbon
abatement aim.











A marginal increase in the number of member countries in the climate coalition will increase
the world market price, if the new member country k has to increase its effort of carbon abate-
ment (Gc > Gk). If so, the mechanism is the same as when the climate coalition increases its
abatement effort Gc.
Party Platforms As it is standard in the political economy literature, we simplify the voting
problem and assume that voters have to decide on the national level of emission reduction only.
The climate preference parameter aih ≥ 0 (i.e., the perception of costs from climate change) is
continuously distributed over households in each country i and the median voter m in country
i has a preference parameter aim = 1. Note that aih can be uniformly distributed, implying
aih ∈ [0,2], but this does not have to be the case.
FollowingWittman(1977, 1983)andtheﬁndingsinLeeetal. (2004), weassumeideological
parties. There are at least R≥2 parties in country i, which differ in their preferences for climate
protection. We denote the climate preference parameter of a party r by ar
i. ar
i <1 characterizes
‘traditional parties’, being primarily interested in ﬁrm proﬁts and privateconsumption,whereas
‘green parties’ are characterized by a high concern about climate change, ar
i > 1.8
A party platform Gr
i is deﬁned as the level of national emission reduction announced by a
8The analysis to follow and all results would be identical, if we alternatively assume a standard median voter
model in the tradition of Downs (1957), in which R ≥ 4 opportunistic parties maximize their voting shares. For
R = 2 parties, convergence became trivial, since both would pick the median voter position. For R = 3, it is well-
known that a political equilibrium does not exist in such a setting. See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000). In the
simplest case, therefore, voters were uniformly and continuously distributed on the interval aih ∈ [0,2] and there
were R = 4 parties. Then, parties 1 and 2 would pick the position of the voter at 0.5, viz., ai0.5, whilst parties 3
and 4 would pick position 1.5 and ai1,5. In both settings, time inconsistency is not an issue.
8party ri in country i, given the abatement costs pG(z) and with it the implemented abatement
measures z, the number of member countries in the climate coalition, K = 1+k, and the abate-
ment effort in non-member countries, Gj. Party ri will derive its party platform by maximizing
the utility function in equation (4), given its preference parameter ar
i and taking into account
the effects on national proﬁts and the world market price.
Consequently, the national carbon abatement Gr











i  vi(E) s.t. (3) and E =E((1+k) Gr
i,Gk+1,...,Gn+1), (13)
where we already made use of the national demand function (6). Hence, Gr
i is determined by



























The last term on the left hand side represents the increase in utility if the countries in the
climate coalition marginally increase their CO2 abatement, leading to a marginal decrease in
global emissions by (1+k) ¶E
¶Gr
i
. The effect is the larger, the stronger the perception of climate
change ar
i is. The effect increases also with the number of member countries in the union,
viz., with k. The reason is that multilateral action within the union mitigates the standard
underinvestment problem for public goods, where free-riding is always an option.
The total level of emissions E is determined by the sum of CO2 abatement within the cli-
mate coalition and the unilaterally chosen climate protection efforts in all countries outside the
climate coalition.9 Reducing emissions, however, causes two kinds of costs. First, an increase
in national abatement effort Gr
i decreases proﬁts of the national ﬁrm, since the increase in costs
is larger than the increase in the world market price. This can be taken from the second term
on the left hand side of (14), where p− 1+k
n+1pGGr
i ≥ xs
i > 0 because n+1 ≥ 1+k. Decreasing
proﬁts decrease disposable income and with it private consumption. Second, an increase in Gi
increases the world market price, see equation (11). This leads to a further decrease in private





p . If there were no resource costs, pG = 0, we had
dp
dGr
i = 0, and both cost
terms dropped to zero. In this case, all parties in all countries would be willing to avoid all
emissions and we would end up with Gr
i = Gmax
i ∀ r and with E = 0.
Inserting maximum proﬁts from equation (3) as well as the supply function (2), the second
9For k = 0, we have the non-cooperative case, where all countries choose their abatement effort unilaterally.
The advantage of our chosen setting is that the effect of writing bilateral or multilateral contracts on the party
platform Gr
i can easily be derived by varying the number of coalition members k (e.g., from k = 0 to k = 1).































































which is fulﬁlled at least as long as the ‘absolute harm aversion’ AHA(E) = v′′/v′(E) > 0
against damage from global warming is sufﬁciently large; that is if the subutility function over
climate change vi(E) is sufﬁciently convex.
Climate Coalitions There are two possibilities for forming a climate coalition in this paper.
Either a union of K countries, having an identical production at the outset (i.e., for Gi = 0 ∀i ∈
K), commits to a common level Gc of national carbon abatement in all member countries i (i.e.,
Gi = Gc ∀i = 1,...1+k) or a union of Z countries agrees on establishing a set of international
abatement mechanisms z, affecting resource costs pG(z) of reducing CO2-emissions.
In the following, we will draw on
Deﬁnition 1. A successful climate coalition is a union, in which
(i) either any new member country k has to increase its primal abatement effort to Gc > Gk
and where this increase leads to a reduction in emissions; that is ¶E
¶Gc  Gc− ¶E
¶Gk  Gk < 0,
(ii) or implementing an improved set of abatement mechanisms z decreases resource costs in
abatement (¶pG(z)/¶z < 0) leading to an increase of national carbon abatement in all
member countries; that is ¶Gi
¶pG
¶pg
¶z > 0 ∀i ∈ Z.
Strategy (i) mirrors the idea behind agreements like the Kyoto-Protocol. However, this strat-
egy revealed some problems in the process of renegotiating Kyoto II, culminating in the failure
of the Copenhagen climatesummitin December 2009. The latter strategy (ii) features the focus
ofcooperativeagreements oncost-reducing, economicallyefﬁcientﬂexibilitymechanisms. Ex-
amples are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), where countries are allowed to fulﬁll
their emission reduction by investing in developing countries, which have a lower standard of
energy efﬁciency and therefore lower marginal abatement costs (see, e.g., Br´ echet and Lussis,
2006; Haites and Yamin, 2000, Partridge and Gamkhar, 2010), or the establishment of inter-
national emission trading systems (Buchner and Carraro, 2006; Carbone et al., 2009).10 More
10In fact, the International Energy Agency (2000, p. 234f) argued very early that fulﬁlling the Kyoto-
commitments necessarily requires implementing an international emission trading system, since domestic mea-
sures alone would carry too high economic costs. Furthermore, the abatement costs would decrease with the
number of participating countries.
10recently, economic ﬂexibility has been increased by including ‘avoided deforestation and for-
est degradation’ (REDD) in a post-Kyoto agreement as negotiated at the Copenhagen climate
summit (see Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 6) and expanded at the climate summit in Canc´ un
in December 2010.
Note that ‘successful’ in our terms only implies a reduction in national CO2-emissions and a
decrease in effective abatement costs; it does not need to imply an optimal solution for climate
protection. Hence, even if regime-effectiveness is violated and all countries in a coalition do
not reduce emissions of CO2 more than they would do in a unilateral setting, such a coalition
would be ‘successful,’ as long as effective abatement costs decrease. Furthermore, we are
modeling ﬂexible abatement mechanisms in an ideal world. In reality, these mechanisms have
to be designed soundly in order to avoid situations, where, e.g., CDM-measures represent pure
windfall gains, since they would have been implemented by host-countries anyway, or where
they even are counterproductive and increase global emissions. See, e.g., Flues et al. (2010)
and Partridge and Gamkhar (2010).
3 Policy Convergence
We are now going to show that both international agreements on implementing (economically
efﬁcient) ﬂexible abatement mechanisms and on collectively reducing CO2-emissions can ex-
plain partial convergence in party platforms Gr
i in a country i. The same holds true for cost-
saving progress, improving abatement technologies.
3.1 Introducing Flexible Abatement Mechanisms
A climate coalition Z can agree on improving the set of (international) abatement mechanisms
z to reduce resource costs of carbon abatement. One example is the designated possibility
of purchasing emission allowances from activities of ‘avoided deforestation’ in regions with
rainforests within the framework of a post-Kyoto climate agreement. Investments in reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation grant emission allowances, which can be
traded in the European Emission Trading System (ETS); see Schlamadinger et al. (2005) for
the so-called REDD-mechanism. Such ﬂexibility in abatement mechanisms is considered as
decreasing marginal abatement costs pG(z), since, e.g., a REDD measure is less costly than
traditional abatement measures in industrial countries (see Anger and Sathaye, 2008).
Hence, the effect, which such agreements on efﬁcient abatement mechanisms have on party
platforms, correspondsto theeffects ofcost-savingtechnologicalprogressin abatementmecha-
nisms. Thus, weare ableto deal withbothissuesby analyzinga decrease in(marginal)resource
costs pG for reducing CO2-emissions. To save notation, we will drop ¶pG/¶z < 0 and focus on
the change in pG directly.
11Let us start with analyzing the effect of a decrease of resource costs pG at a given carbon
abatement Gi on the economic activity in a coalition country i.
Lemma 1. A reduction in resource costs pG of climate protection increases production xs
i,
proﬁts p∗
i and consumption xd
i in a member country i of a successful climate coalition, if its
initiallygiven carbon abatement level Gi is higher than an adjusted average ¯ Ga
j in non-member
countries.











(n−k)2 < Gk. Thus, improving abatement mechanisms en-
hances the economic activity in a country under mild conditions.
Simple intuition would then tell us that the abatement effort Gr
i, offered by any party pi,
should increase when resource costs pG of climate protection and with it the world market
price p of the consumption good decrease. However, ﬁrst intuition may fail, since there are
opposing price and quantity effects, and we cannot sign the change in abatement efforts offered
in reaction to a reduction of resource costs pG. Lower resource costs make climate protection
perunitproducedoftheprivategoodcheaper, butat thesametimelowerresourcecostsincrease
total production of the consumption good. Hence, the combined marginal effect on ﬁrms’
proﬁts is ambiguous. A similar argument applies to private consumption: the increase in the
world market price is lower for lower resource costs, but as households consume more units,
they have to pay the increased price on more units. Accordingly, the marginal effect on utility













from implicitly differentiating the ﬁrst order condition (14). Note that ¶H
¶Gr
i
= SOC < 0.
Our main interest, however, is in comparing the magnitude of this change across different
parties in member countries of a successful climate coalition. Fortunately, the effect of the



















From Deﬁnition 1, a successful climate coalition implies
¶Gr
i
¶pG < 0, and the interpretation of
equation (17) can be summarized as
Proposition1. Whenasuccessfulclimatecoalitionreduces resourcecostsofclimateprotection
by implementing a ﬂexible (international) abatement mechanism, this decrease will lead to a
partial convergence in carbon abatement offered by parties in a coalition country.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
12A decrease in marginal resource costs pG will always have a stronger positiveimpact on par-
ties with lower preference for climate protection, since the reduction in private consumption,
which is necessary for increasing climate protection, is smaller the more abatement costs de-
crease. As traditional parties are more concerned about private consumption and ﬁrms’ proﬁts,
they react more strongly on this cost decrease. Hence, the increase in carbon abatement offered
in their party platforms will be higher than for green parties, as the latter attach less value to
private consumption (and demand climate protection less elastically, respectively). No matter
whether marginal abatement costs decrease due to implementing more efﬁcient mechanisms
by an international agreement or by cost-saving technological progress, there will be a partial
convergence in party platforms as long as a cost decrease fosters the carbon abatement effort.
Improving the efﬁciency of abatement mechanisms as an explanatory variable should be
of relevance. Such improvements were already embedded in the Kyoto-Protocol, in which (i)
a group of countries (e.g., the EU) can assign emission reductions differently across mem-
ber countries as long as the group fulﬁlls its aggregate reduction (‘EU emission bubble’); in
which (ii) countries can invest in emission abatement in other (treaty) countries and claim the
achieved reductions (‘joint implementation’); and in which (iii) special rules for investments
in developing countries are introduced (‘clean development mechanism’ CDM), leading to a
similar effect like joint implementation. Since then, efﬁciency has increased by more ﬂexibility
in CDM measures (see EU linking-directive 2004/101/EG) and by implementing the REDD
approach on avoided deforestation. Furthermore, a global linking of different, regional Emis-
sion Trading Systems (Anger, 2008) and including the transportation sector or households in
the Emission Trading System (Endres and Ohl, 2005) are under discussion at the moment.11
Note, however, that the effect described in Proposition 1 does not change voting shares in
a one-dimensional voting decision. We observe a shift in optimal climate protection for each
voter, but the distribution of voters remains the same. Thus, the outcome of an election will not
change as long as all party platforms are adjusted accordingly. This may change if there are
more dimensions besides climate protection, as will be shortly discussed in subsection 3.3.
3.2 Forming A Climate Coalition With Common Abatement Levels
In this subsection, we analyze the effect of a climate coalition, in which all members agree on
a common level of emission reduction. Though highly stylized, this setting features, e.g., the
Kyoto-Protocol. The major difference here is that we assume an agreement on identical carbon
abatement efforts, whereas in the Kyoto-Protocol countries committed themselves to distinct
abatementlevels. However, ouranalysiscan furthermorecapturetheeffect ofabilateralclimate
treaty by evaluating all results at k = 0.
Again, we are interested in the effect of such agreements on the different party platforms
within one country, i.e., on the reaction functions of national parties. Therefore, we do not
11Both amendments would balance abatement costs between economies and sectors.
13solve for the equilibrium outcome of climate protection and we do not examine under which
conditions such a coalition is stable and incentive-compatible. See, e.g., Besley and Coate
(2003, section 5) for an optimal cooperative solution (and its justiﬁcation) in a centralized
setting of providing local public goods with spillover effects.
Focusing on a successful climate coalition, country k, newly entering the coalition, has a
primal abatement effort being lower than the commitment level in the coalition (i.e., Gc > Gk)
and less emission reduction (viz., ¶E
¶Gc  Gc− ¶E
¶Gk  Gk < 0).12 Hence, from equation (12), the
world market price for good x increases and we can state for the economicactivityin a coalition
country i with initially given carbon abatement Gc.
Lemma 2. Enlarging a successful climate coalition increases both production and proﬁts in
all former coalition countries. Consumption in an old member country i increases (decreases),
if it is a net exporter (importer).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Obviously, the restrictions for a positive effect on private consumption in country i are
stricter than for a decrease in resource costs as analyzed in the previous subsection, and en-
largement of a climate coalition beneﬁts private consumption only in those countries, produc-
ing more than they consumeso that the increase in proﬁts dominates the decrease in purchasing
power.
The effect of expanding the climate coalition on the party platform Gr
i of a party with pref-
erence ar
i in a coalition country i can in our model be derived from implicitly differentiating
the ﬁrst order condition (14). Thereby, we will implicitly impose the assumption that any party
r in country i can dictate the coalition’s level of carbon abatement Gc. This is a rather weak
assumption if country i is newly forming a coalition with a second country; that is if evaluating
a change from k = 0 to k = 1. However, it becomes a (very) strong assumption for the case of
an existing or a large coalition.
The effect on the desired level of abatement effort Gr












As pointed out in Lemma 2, a price increase ceteris paribus has a negative effect on consump-
tion and it depends on whether country i is a net exporter or a net importer of good x, whether
utility in private consumption increases or decreases. Furthermore, there is a negative effect
on the marginal willingness to pay, which decreases due to diminishing marginal utility, when
country k increases its abatement effort. The latter implicitly mirrors the free-riding incentive
inherent in a climatecoalition. See theappendix to Proposition2 forthe formal effects in detail.
12This is also the most reasonableassumption, because it is hardlyrealistic that a countrywith a high abatement
effort voluntarily joins a climate coalition, where it has to decrease its standard.
14A sufﬁcient condition for an increase in carbon abatement Gr
i due to enlarging a climate
coalition (and for sustaining deﬁnition 1) is that the previous abatement effort in the joining
countryissufﬁcientlycloseto theabatementeffort incountryi andthat countryiisan exporting
country. See also appendix A.4 for a formal analysis.
The result we are interested in, however, is the effect on the difference between abatement
efforts offered by different parties in country i. Indeed, there will be a platform convergence,
when enlarging the climate coalition raises the desired abatement effort for all parties (i.e., for
any preference parameter ar




i(E) >0 is sufﬁciently
large; that is if there is enough concern about global warming in country i, or if the coalition
























































for sufﬁcient AHA(E). SOC < 0 is given by equation (15), and sign{¶H
¶k } = sign{
¶Gr
i










< 0 follow from focusing on a successful climate coalition.
Proposition 2. Enlarging a successful climate coalition leads to partial platform convergence
in the sense that the announced abatement efforts across parties are converging towards a
common value, if either absolute harm aversion against global warming or coalition size are
sufﬁciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
The intuition behind this result is as follows: If more countries join a successful climate
coalition, their ﬁrms face higher production costs due to an increase in their abatement invest-
ments, and the world market price for the consumption good increases. Therefore, increased
national emission reduction effort in any country i is less harmful to the competitiveness of the
industry in the country under consideration. In other words, the more countries form a suc-
cessful climate coalition, the less distortive national climate protection requirements will be,
with respect to the international allocation of production. Though the increase in price p for
good x has ceteris paribus a negativeeffect on consumption, the total effect can reduce effective
abatement costs by reducing the indirect ‘economic’ costs for any given resource cost pG of
reducing CO2-emissions. However, the reduction in effective abatement costs matters more for
traditional parties, having a smaller preference parameter ar
i, than for green parties, since the
former are relatively more interested in proﬁts and private consumption. Consequently, tradi-
tional parties will catch up and the level of climate protection offered in their party platform
will approach the level offered by green parties: we observe a (partial) convergence in policy
platforms deﬁned over environmental policy (i.e., climate protection).
15When enlarging the coalition, there is an offsetting effect on convergence, stemming from
overcoming the free-riding problem by partial coordination. Ceteris paribus, this effect would
increase abatement efforts for green parties more than for traditional ones. However, this effect
becomes less relevant, the larger the climate coalition is or the larger general concern about
global warming is. Still, the required assumptions for deriving Proposition 2 are surprisingly
strong. This is not to say that a successful climate agreement will not lead to partial conver-
gence, but signing such an agreement which leads all parties to increase theirclimate protection
offer might be difﬁcult. Indeed, the negative effect of a price increase on private consumption
(all else equal) might provide an additional explanation for the failure in negotiating a post-
Kyoto agreement, besides free-riding in coalitions (e.g., Barrett and Stavins, 2003). If optimal
carbon abatement does not increase for all parties within a country, an agreement with commit-
ments on abatement levels could also lead to further divergence. The clash in climate policy
between Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. might partially be explained along these lines.
Focusing on a successful agreement and having in mind the Kyoto-Protocol, the size of this
climate coalition should be sufﬁciently large and absolute harm aversion with respect to global
warming should be large at least in Europe. Therefore, Proposition 2 should hold for European
countries as long as forming a climate coalition (and signing a treaty on environmental protec-
tion respectively) reduces emissions. For the latter, there is some supporting evidence, though
the Kyoto-Protocol is less dynamic than other examples and though there are some problems
in its institutional design. The European Environment Agency calculated for the EU-15 that
the Kyoto-induced additional effort – neglecting additional ﬂexibility instruments – has led
to an emission reduction of 6.2 percent by 2008 compared with a projected augmentation of
emissions in a business-as-usual-scenario (European Environmental Agency 2006, p. 5; 2009,
p. 9). Incorporating further ﬂexibility mechanisms should add an additional reduction of 4.6
percent (European Environmental Agency, 2009, p. 11). In total, the EU would easily fulﬁll
the 8 percent reduction as required by the Kyoto-Protocol and most emission reductions are
attributed to EU-policy regulations.13
Besides the Kyoto-Protocol, there are many examples of international environmental agree-
ments, e.g., the ‘Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer’ or the ‘In-
ternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships’ (MARPOL 73/78), which
– in accordance with rationalist regime-theory in the ﬁeld of international relations – actually
caused a gradual enhancement of national environmental protection standards over time and
which were backed by a broad consensus among member countries.14 These agreements and
the necessary national regulations were widely supported by all national parties in the member
countries.
Again, in a one-dimensional setting, there will be a shift in optimal national reduction levels
13About 82 percent of the emission savings in the EU-27 in 2010 are expected to be driven by EU-Commission
directives aiming to implement the Kyoto-Protocol. See European EnvironmentalAgency (2009, p. 48f).
14See, e.g., Gehring (1994; ch.4), Victor (1995) and Z¨ urn (1997, pp. 48) for an overview and summary of the
effectiveness of older agreements.
16for each voter, but the distribution of voters remains constant.
3.3 Discussion
From our analysis, it follows that, at least for a policy of internalizing additive atmosphere
externalities (i.e., for providing global public goods) and for environmental policy, there can
be other reasons for policy convergence besides repeated games and time consistency issues
(Alesina, 1987, 1988) and two-level games (e.g., Dorussen and Nanou, 2006). International
agreements on reducing CO2-emissions or on improving abatement mechanisms can lead to
partial platform convergence in member countries, if national parties (and voters) put different
weights on, e.g., climate protection. These agreements will reduce effective economic costs
of internalization and since parties with lower weights on climate protection value private con-
sumptionmore, theywillrespondmorestronglyto acostdecrease, implyinga largerincreasein
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Figure 1: Party platform changes in climate protection
This effect can be illustrated in a simpliﬁed diagram, see Figure 1. Assume that effective
marginal abatement costs (MC) are linear and that there are ‘linear demand functions’ (MB) for
carbon abatement, reﬂecting reaction functions of different parties in country i. The demand




i . Optimal party
platforms for each party ri in country i are found by the intersection of its demand function
MBir with the marginal cost curve MC. Then, the analysis can be summarized in Figure 1 by
examining the effect of a downward shift in marginal costs from MCh to MCl.
For all parties, a reduction in effective abatement costs will increase the offered level of
abatement effort. However, the increase is larger for traditional parties than for green parties
(DCPi3 > DCPi1), since the latter demand climate protection less elastically. Indeed, if the
17price (i.e., effective costs) of reducing emissions dropped to zero, all parties would offer a full
reduction in emission, viz., a protection level (an abatement effort) of 100%.
The asymmetric effect of endogenous implementation costs can be applied to other policy
ﬁelds as well, as long as costless policy implementation implies that all parties will choose
the same policy. For these cases, empirical ﬁndings that ideology hardly affects budgetary
affairs (e.g., Potrafke, 2011b), could alsobeexplainedbycost reductionslevelingthedifference
in partisans’ optimal spending. Furthermore, the new German consensus on a rapid nuclear
phaseout after the Fukushima disaster could be explained along our lines: Nobody wants to
run the nuclear risk if costs are too high. Now, the accident in Fukushima has proven that the
effective costs of nuclear energy can be extremely high. Hence, the net costs of a phaseout
dropped signiﬁcantly – and the traditional parties reacted more elastically on this cost change.
Can one infer from our ﬁndings, however, that green parties should fear successful climate
agreements? Our model shows that they do not have to in a one-dimensional world, when the
level of desired abatement effort and climate protection is shifted for the entire distribution
of voters. Though green parties will lose their unique green policy position (i.e., their unique
selling proposition), their share of votes can still remain very stable in election outcomes.
However, the picture changes if one allows for multi-dimensionalsettings. Assume that vot-
ers consider two issues: climate protection and crime prevention. For simplicity presume that
both issues are independent of each other and that green parties have a unique selling proposi-
tion in climate protection, whereas traditional parties are rather seen as competent in providing
crime prevention. In such a world, a policy convergence in climate protection can have disas-
trous effects for green parties. Since the difference in carbon abatement efforts shrinks or even
becomes marginal, crime prevention becomes the focal point for voters. Consequently, green
parties might be marginalized, if they stick to their original party platform (e.g., in the case of
ideological parties). Alternatively, green parties have to adjust to the stricter crime-prevention
regime of traditional parties. Dismissing their ideology (in non-environmental issues) would
then be rewarded by preserving or even signiﬁcantly extending their voting shares.15 As an
example might serve the secession of the so-called ‘realo-fraction’ from the Swiss green party
and the foundation of the (nation-wide) green liberal party in 2007. Whilst the Swiss ‘greens’
are still very left-wing relative to European average, the Swiss ‘green-liberals’ clearly moved
into the political center – and, for a newly founded party, have been relatively successful in
their ﬁrst election campaign (see, e.g., Baer and Seitz, 2008).16 In this sense, really ideologi-
cal green parties should fear successful international agreements on climate protection, though
these agreements lead to a higher reduction of CO2-Emissions.
In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that green parties have tried to prevent too efﬁcient inter-
national agreements and in particular have opposed to implement ﬂexible market mechanisms.
15Furthermore, the space for governing coalitions increases for green parties, since the largest leveling of ‘ide-
ological differences’ is achieved between the greens and the most traditional party (e.g., the conservatives).
16Another example might be the German ‘greens,’ becoming more an more a mainstream party, if their share in
the latest opinion polls should materialize as votes in the next election.
18A salient example is the 6th Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change in The Hague in November 2000, where the French and German environmental minis-
ters, being negotiators on behalf of the EU, prevented a compromise with the U.S. administra-
tion.17 The U.S. government preferred a market-based solution, including an extended consid-
eration of carbon sinks and emission trading, and credibly threatened with a withdrawal from
their Kyoto-commitments, if their claims should not be fulﬁlled. In the end, the U.S. stepped
back from the Kyoto-Protocol due to the opposition of the EU against a further extension of
economic ﬂexibility. The failure of this conference turned out to be a major setback for climate
protection.18 Afterwards, many observers mainly blamed green party members or supporters
from the environmental ministries– especially the German J¨ urgen Trittin– to have strategically
prevented a market-driven compromise solution (see, e.g., Jacoby and Reiner, 2001, p. 301f;
Vrolijk, 2001, p.167f; and Grubb and Yamin, 2001, p. 275).
Morerecently, theGerman green partypledforamaximumof‘home-made’emissionreduc-
tions by the national enterprises and argued for limiting the generation of emission certiﬁcates
by cost-savingabatement mechanisms,e.g., theCDM, and theirtrade intheEuropean Emission
Trading System (ETS). Flexibility mechanisms should only by ancillary measures.19
Another example might be the strong defense of the agreement on nuclear phaseout in Ger-
many in the pre-Fukushima era. Postponing the phaseout could eventually smooth the costs
of changing the energy mix, until sufﬁcient renewable energy is available, but the German
‘greens’ were not willing to discuss this issue at all. Following our analysis, this might have
not been due to the fact that the nuclear phaseout is one of their foundation principles (as often
declared), but driven by the desire to keep the costs of emission reductions rather high.
Put together, the observed behavior of ‘green’ politicians might be explained by strategic
concerns in policy making in order to sustain their unique selling proposition. Clearly, this
issue deserves further analysis, but this topic is left for further research, since it is beyond the
scope of the present paper.
4 An International Application
Our analysis can also be transferred to an international setting, by interpreting differences in
the preference parameter ar
i as differences in the national priorities of climate protection.
Some years ago, the focus of both politicians and political scientists was lying on imple-
menting ‘command-and-control regulations’, establishing a kind of ‘international government’
17At that time, both ministers, Dominique Voynet and J¨ urgen Trittin, were members of the green party in the
respective country.
18Even compared to a situation, where the desired ﬂexibility mechanisms would have been callow and less
effective in reducing emissions, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto-Protocol created umpteen times more
emissions. See Brandt and Svendsen (2002, p. 1191f) and Jacoby and Reiner (2001, p. 302).
19See the petition no. 17/120 from December 02, 2009 of the German green party in the German Bundestag.
Note that the conservative-liberal majority in the Bundestag exactly favors the opposite. See petition no. 17/100
from December 01, 2009.
19and enforcing commitments on emission reduction. However, the negotiating history of the
international climate protection regime clearly shows that this kind of policy approach created
too many conﬂicts with other international laws and institutionalized normative principles. Ex-
amples are the right to ‘catch up,’ being guaranteed to developingcountries in the Johannesburg
Declaration of 2002, which then served as further justiﬁcation for developing countries not to
engage in national abatement obligations (Pohlmann, 2004), and the ban of carbon taxes on
imports (from countries with lax climate protection), since these taxes are at odds with the free
trade regulation of the WTO (Pitschas, 1995, Whalley and Walsh, 2009). Furthermore, the
‘command-and-control’ approach turned out to be ineffective (Nordhaus, 2006). Its failure be-
came most obviousduring the climate summitin Copenhagen in December 2009, having raised
doubts that successful climate agreements on protection levels (i.e., on national reductions in
emissions)can internationally be implemented at the moment. One reason should be that coun-
tries are still willing to avoid losses in production (stemming from costly climate requirements)
and in national purchasing power (due to an increased world market price).
Therefore, most of the recent contributions to international climate policy clearly favor
market-based solutions. The majority of these authors recommends higher economic ﬂexi-
bility, improving the efﬁciency of abatement mechanisms, e.g., by connecting emission trading
systems and by implementing CDM and REDD, in order to decrease marginal abatement costs
as much as possible. See Endres (2010, part 5) and Whalley and Walsh (2009) for an overview.
Others include mechanisms for technological cooperation (Buchner and Carraro, 2006) or car-
bon taxes as a hybrid price-quantity solution (e.g., Aldy et al., 2003; Nordhaus, 2006). Ac-
cording to Brandt and Svendsen (2002) and Stavins (2008), making global abatement measures
more efﬁcient by ameliorating ﬂexibility-mechanisms appears to be the only way of advancing
international cooperation in this ﬁeld at this stage. Indeed, ﬁndings from numerical simulations
in Carbone et al. (2009) show that decreasing abatement costs by establishing international
emission trading systems leads to signiﬁcant emission reductions, even if governments behave
non-cooperatively in setting the (national) level of emission permits.
Our results support this view. Implementing efﬁcient abatement mechanisms and improving
abatement technologies seem to be advantageous. First, production costs and the world market
price are decreased. Under mild conditions, this increases ﬁrms’ proﬁts as well as households’
consumption. This is the major difference to forming a climate coalition and committing to
abatement effort levels, where an increasing world market price always has a negative effect
on consumption all else equal. In that sense, a strategy for more ﬂexibility and efﬁciency
would take into account the worries about the economic development of countries (as, e.g.,
being present in reluctant countries like China, India and the U.S.). Consequently, countries
are more willing to increase their voluntary abatement effort. Second, if improving abatement
mechanisms leads to higher abatement efforts in all countries, we can conclude from trans-
ferring Proposition 1 to an international level that there will be at least partial convergence in
desired levels of emission reductions across countries. Countries with less emphasis on climate
20protection will increase their voluntary reduction effort more than those countries which are
highly concerned about global warming. Accordingly, it should also be easier to sign agree-
ments with commitments on abatement efforts in a second step, since the difference between
national objectives is leveled. Hence, our ﬁndings support the view in Endres and Ohl (2002)
that the ‘cooperative push’ of an international environmental agreement signiﬁcantly depends
on the (correct) choice of abatement instruments and the call in Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) for
cost-reducing R&D investment as part of such agreements.
In a nutshell, one policy relevant interpretation of our results is that the priority of cli-
mate policy should be investing resources and effort into improving and implementing efﬁ-
cient abatement mechanisms and providing (free) access to these mechanisms. Such a strategy
should foster international climate protection in various ways and prove more efﬁcient than
spending resources on climate conferences (as, e.g., the Copenhagen summit 2009), if climate
agendas of countries differ a lot.
5 Conclusions
Analyzing a model of international climate protection, we have shown that the convergence
in environmental party platforms across parties can be explained by international agreements,
even if parties behave as partisans according to recent empirical evidence. If these agreements
decrease the effective abatement costs, the optimal level of climate protection increases more
for traditional parties than for green parties and the difference shrinks. This is driven by the
fact that traditional parties react more elastically on reductions in abatement costs, since they
are primarily interested in ﬁrms’ proﬁts and purchasing power and appreciate cost reductions
strongly. Our result, using climate policy as an example, applies also to other policy ﬁelds,
where endogenous policy implementation costs decrease due to, e.g., (international) agree-
ments or technological progress.
Green parties do not need to fear the resulting loss of their unique selling proposition as
long as there is only a one-dimensional voting problem. However, in a multi-dimensional
setting, the effect can be disastrous – or requires forsaking ideological positions in other policy
ﬁelds. Further research should clarify whether green parties are well aware of this problem
and strategically try to prevent market-based abatement mechanisms and too efﬁcient climate
agreements, as indicated by someanecdotal evidence. If so, their guidelinewould be that ‘more
climate protection is ﬁne, but at rather high costs, please.’
With respect to designing an international climate policy, it can be taken from our model
that investing into efﬁcient abatement mechanisms is preferable to climate summits which fail
because the objectives of countries are too divergent. Reducing abatement costs ﬁrst by estab-
lishing efﬁcient and ﬂexible mechanisms should lead to a convergence in national interests and
should facilitate signing a post-Kyoto agreement on emission reductions in a second step.
21A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In order to derive a sufﬁcient condition for the effect on production and proﬁts, we differentiate
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j, and where xs
i = p− pGGi. Sufﬁcient conditions for an


























i < 0, (21)
are either that proﬁts increase, dpi
dpG < 0, or that the country is a net importer xd
i > xs
i.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The FOC (14) for the optimal policy platform G∗






















and from applying comparative statics and SOC < 0, it follows that sign{
¶G∗
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¶pG} = sign{ ¶H
¶pG};












































cannot be signed in general. The reason is that a decrease in resource costs pG reduces abate-
ment costs per unit of production, but at the same time total production increases, implying that
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≷ 0. (23)
22The analogous argument holds true for the effect on marginal abatement costs in private con-
sumption. A decrease in pG fosters income and reduces the increase in the world market price,
but the still increasing world market price must be paid on more units, because consumption
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However, from applying Deﬁnition 1, for a successful climate coalition a decrease in resource
costs pG increases abatement effort Gi and we have ¶H













< 0 and ¶H
¶pG < 0. Since all parties ri want to avoid all national emissions when effective
abatement costs are zero (evaluate(14) for pG =0), all party platforms Gr
i converge to the same







i > 0 proves Proposition 1.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
From Deﬁnition 1, we have Gc > Gk for a successful climate coalition; consequently,
dp
dk > 0
from (12). For a given abatement level Gc, this then implies for ﬁrms’ proﬁts in all coalition
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> (<) 0, if xs
i > (<) xd
i , (25)
that is if country i is a net exporter (importer).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Evaluating the ﬁrst order condition (14) for the optimal abatement effort G∗



























The effect of enlarging the climate coalition by country k on the party platform of a party (and
the desired abatement effort of a voter, respectively) with preference parameter ar
i is found by
















23Since SOC < 0 from equation (15), we are left with sign{
¶Gr
i
¶k } = sign{¶H
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¶Gk  Gk < 0. For a sufﬁcient condition guaranteeing an increase in carbon
abatement, assume that the difference between the abatement effort in the coalition and the
original level in country k is sufﬁciently small, Gc−Gk → 0. Then, we can utilize
dp
dk → 0 as
well as ¶E
¶Gc − ¶E


















for an exporting country implying xs
i > xd
i .
To prove Proposition 2, we have to differentiate equation (27) for the preference parameter
ar














































Assuming that party r can set the carbon abatement level in a successful climate coalition,
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24in equation (19), if there is sufﬁcient harm aversion against global warming (i.e., if AHA(E) =
v′′
i /v′
i is high) or if the coalition size K = 1+k is large enough. Then, the increase in the
offered abatement effort decreases in the preference parameter ar
i for climate protection. Since
a high preference parameter implies originally a high abatement effort in the party platform, the
distance between abatement efforts is reduced across platforms. Moreover, since all parties ri
want to avoid all national emissionswhen effectiveabatement costs are zero, all party platforms
Gr
i converge towards the same level of national emission reduction Gi ∀ r, and we have a
(partial) convergence in party platforms.
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